Inventory senders
We identify the platforms and services that legitimately send in the domain name before we strengthen our DNS policies.
SPF, DKIM, and DMARC are just part of the problem. We link them to identity security, real referral providers, and the processes needed for phishing, BEC, and compromised accounts.
Authentication rollout
We start with real referral sources and increase enforcement only after we know what needs to remain legitimate.
We identify the platforms and services that legitimately send in the domain name before we strengthen our DNS policies.
We define authorized infrastructure and remove old or unknown sources that increase the spoofing area and record complexity.
We validate signature for active providers, selectors, and alignment with the domain used in legitimate streams.
We start from reports and alignments to see who sends and what would be affected by a stricter policy.
We gradually strengthen the policy once legitimate sources are known and errors that may block the valid email have been corrected.
Changes in suppliers, selectors, and referral streams must be tracked so that the posture does not degrade after roll-out.
Domain + identity
Domain authentication reduces direct spoofing. Identity controls reduce the risk that a compromised legitimate mailbox becomes the attacker’s channel. We need both.
A compromised password should not be enough to access critical accounts.
We investigate sign-ins, sessions and unusual behaviors when there is suspicion of compromise.
Hidden or modified rules may maintain access or exfiltrate conversations after the initial compromise.
Administrative accounts and high-impact roles should be separated and reviewed in proportion to the risk.
Recovery methods, alias and alternative channels can become a bypass path if left uncontrolled.
Start from the symptom
Not all email problems are DMARC problems and not all phishing incidents are DNS problems.
We check the SPF/DKIM alignment, DMARC policy and actual referral sources before moving to enforcement.
We separate authentication, reputation, and configuration issues from changes that can do more harm to deliverability.
We also treat the issue as an identity incident: accounts, sessions, forwarding, MFA, reset, referral sources and similar domains.
We document each authorized source and avoid unsustainable SPF records or remaining DKIM selectors from old services.
Provider-neutral
Security doesn’t have to become a disguised commercial migration. We set up controls around the existing platform when it can support the requirements.
Domain authentication, identity controls and review in the context of the existing tenant.
DNS authentication and account security without forced migration to another provider.
Domain configuration and controls available in the provider model.
SPF, DKIM, DMARC and posture review for organizations using the Zoho ecosystem.
We map the sources of applications, billing, marketing and other systems that send email automatically.
We separate streams and ownership so that a new service doesn’t break the policy of the entire domain.
Live posture
A good configuration today can go wrong after a new provider, a migration, or a SaaS service starts sending in the name of the domain.
Include your email in a Security Assessment01 · INCIDENT
Triage, containment and recovery for compromised accounts or sessions.
02 · PRIVACY
Connect the security of risk communication and the relevant technical measures.
03 · PROGRAM
Integrates email into the wider identity, application and incident security program.
Technically it is possible, but it is not a good strategy without inventory of legitimate sources and alignment verification. A strict policy applied too early can block valid streams that your organization has not yet documented.
No. They reduce direct domain impersonation and provide control and visibility over message authentication. Phishing can use similar domains, compromised accounts or other techniques, which is why identity security and incident response processes remain important.
Not normally. We work with the existing platform and separate what needs to be changed in DNS, tenant and identity/security processes. Migration only makes sense if there are separate reasons for it.
The situation should be treated as an incident: sessions, passwords, MFAs, forwarding rules, sign-ins, privileges and other persistence mechanisms must be analyzed before we consider the issue closed.
Identity controls, MFA, domain authentication, incident handling and associated evidence may support relevant controls from ISO27001, SOC2, NIS2 or other programs without a DNS configuration automatically signifying compliance with a framework.
We start with the existing domain and platform, then strengthen the posture without sacrificing legitimate streams.
Talk about Email Security
Can’t find the framework you are looking for?
Talk to us — we may be able to include it in the program.
Not seeing the framework you are looking for?
Reach out — we may already support it in the programme.